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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Since this is a criminal case not involving a first degree felony, this Court has
appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue: Whether a technician's affidavit/certificate regarding maintenance and
certification of an intoxilyzer instrument used to measure appellant's blood alcohol level
is 'testimonial' so that its admission into evidence when the technician is unavailable at
trial violates appellant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.
Sub-issue 1: Whether Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 (2005) which allows
admission of a technician's affidavit/certificate in lieu of live testimony from the
technician is constitutional under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment.
Sub-issue 2: The city respectfully states there is no sub-issue two (2) because
the city does not seek to use a substitute technician/witness. If the city moved to do so in
the trial court the city hereby abandons that effort and sub-issue on appeal.
Standard of Review: Whether the technician's certificate/affidavit is testimonial
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 UT App
493, TflO, 128 P.3d 47. A constitutional challenge to a statute also presents a question of
law reviewed for correctness. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f42, 99 P.3d 820.
Preservation: The city agrees appellant preserved the issue and sub-issue(s).
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TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 (2005), former Utah Code Ann. 41-644.3 (2004); Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223(5) (2005); Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-101, -104,
-120; Utah R. Evid. 102; 104(a); 802; 803(6), (8); 902 (2001); Utah Admin. Rule §§ 70814-8(4) (2004), 714-500 (2004) and the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution are in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The city charged appellant with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI)
with child present, a class A misdemeanor; open container, a class C misdemeanor; and
violation of park curfew, an infraction. R. 1-2. The city sought to admit certified breath
test affidavits/certificates (hereinafter "certificates" or "calibration certificates") prepared
by a technician who was unavailable for trial. Those certificates would show the
intoxilyzer instrument used to measure appellant's blood alcohol level was tested before
and after appellant's arrest date and was found to be operating correctly. A copy of the
certificates is in Addendum B. Appellant moved in limine against admission of the
certificates. The trial court denied appellant's motion and ruled Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a515, the statute under which the certificates are admissible, is constitutional. Appellant
timely petitioned for interlocutory review, which this Court granted.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case has not been tried nor has evidence been presented. Appellant proffered
the following facts for his motion to exclude his breath test result. "On March 31, 2005 at
4:50 a.m. officers observed a white Chevy Lumina parked in the parking lot of a
neighborhood park. Mr. George [appellant] was in the driver's seat and officers noticed
bottles of alcohol in the car. Two other individuals were in the back seat. The officers
had Mr. George do field sobriety tests and took him to the station to submit to a breath
test. The results showed that Mr. George's blood alcohol level was .13." R. 41.
According to the probable cause statement in the charging document the officers making
the arrest were Officers Lowe, Simpson and Willis of the Salt Lake City Police
Department. R. 3.
The city charged appellant with three offenses: (1) driving under the influence of
alcohol (with child present), in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502, a class A
misdemeanor; (2) open container in vehicle, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526,
a class C misdemeanor, (3) violation of park curfew, in violation of Salt Lake City Code §
15.08.020, an infraction. R. 1-3.
The city seeks to admit evidence of appellant's blood alcohol level by admitting a
breath test result card. To do so the city seeks to provide foundational evidence in the
form of calibration certificates in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 and
UTAH ADMIN. RULE 714-500 (2004) to establish the instrument was operating correctly
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when appellant's breath was tested. R. 79-80. When this case was set for trial the
certified breath test technician ("technician") who prepared the applicable certificates was
out of the country and unavailable to testify. R. 42. In his certificate the technician
certified the instrument used to test appellant was working correctiy. Addendum B.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), was issued there has been a
nation-wide challenge to use of calibration certificates. The argument against using them
is that they are testimonial evidence, and thus their use in lieu of live testimony from the
technician who prepares them works to violate confrontation rights in that a defendant is
deprived of the opportunity to cross examine the absent technician.
The overwhelming majority of appellate courts addressing this issue have held
calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are qualitatively different from
both the testimonial statements at issue in Crawford and the abuses at common law
against which the Framer's drafted the Sixth Amendment. Those qualitative differences
are that calibration certificates are not accusatory; certificates are administrative in nature
and neutral toward any particular defendant; certificates are for demonstrating the
integrity of the instrument; certificates are prepared by technicians who do not engage in
investigative or policing functions of law enforcement; certificates could just as well
serve to exonerate a defendant as convict him or her; certificates do not contain
information which is likely to be either bolstered or discredited by cross examination.
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The city also argues they do not meet the primary 'purpose test' articulated in Davis v.
Washington, 126 S.Ct 2266 (2006). (Davis was issued subsequent to some of the
Crawford-calibration certificate cases on which the city relies.) In addition, this Court
should hold the challenged statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515, is a constitutional
statutory exception to the hearsay rule in that it allows calibration certificates to be
admitted as self-authenticating documents without foundational testimony from the
technician or any other person.
ARGUMENT
I.

CALIBRATION CERTIFICATES ARE NONTESTIMONIAL AND
THEREFORE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
DOES NOT BAR THEIR ADMISSION.

A.

Brief description of Crawford.

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the police questioned the
defendant's wife Sylvia Crawford regarding the circumstances of a homicide. As this
Court has summarized: "The defendant in Crawford was charged with assault and
attempted murder. The state introduced a recorded statement made by the defendant's
wife (Wife). Wife was unavailable to testify at trial because of Washington State's
marital privilege. The defendant argued that the admission of the hearsay statements of
Wife violated his Sixth Amendment privilege to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." Salt Lake City v.Williams, 2005 UT App 493 ^|12; 128 P.3d 47. On appeal the U.
S. Supreme Court held the admission of those statements in a criminal trial violated

6

defendant's confrontation rights. Crawford "replaced the existing standard for admission
of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant with a requirem c i \ t 11 K I 11 c s 11111 e 11 u 1
statements could be admitted <nil v i f the doclamnl was unavailable and if there had been a
prior oppoilunit', for noss-examination." Williams, 2005 UT App 493 *p 1. In Crawford
"the Court for the first time distinguished between "testimonial" and "nontestimonial55
out-of-court statements." State v. Carter, I

Crawford,

however, left "for another day any effort to spell < nil a comprehensive definition of
'testimonial1*" Williams, 2005 UT App 493 ^[1L Though various definitions of
"testimonial" were advanced in the Crawford briefs, the Court gave only four explicit
definitions of "testimonial,55 which is thai il "'"applies a( a immmum l»» | I | pnoi testimony
ataprelimmary hearing, |.'| before a gi and jury, or [3] at aformertrial and [4] to police
interrogations/5 reasoning that "these are the modem practices with the closest kinship to
the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.'5 Crawford, vl III,S

I ill

"In- contrast, nontestimonial hearsay can be admitted under generally accepted
exceptions 1o Hie hrnrsnv rule without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment55 Williams.
2005 UT App 493 f 11. "Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent
with the Framers design to afford the States flexible

.-v •; .L V . •. *. * i - * Vn? ;ay

law - as does Roberts, and as woi lid ai I appi oach that exempted such statements from
(ViiilVoniaiioi i < "lause scrutiny altogether.55 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. "Thus, before this
court can apply the appropriate test, [it] must first determine whether the proffered
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hearsay statements are testimonial or nontestimonial." Williams, 2005 UT App 493 ^[14
(citation omitted).
Recently the U. S. Supreme Court further clarified the definition of "testimonial"
in Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006), when it articulated a "primary purpose"
test, holding that statements "are testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate ...
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to a later criminal prosecution." I d at 2274. Davis held statements made to
police during investigation of a crime in the context of a 911 call may be admitted in
court without allowing a defendant to cross-examine the person who made the original
statements when the primary purpose of those statements was to meet an ongoing
emergency. Id. at 2277.
The abuses Crawford described were where justices of the peace, who served in
police investigative capacities, would conduct out-of-court interviews and reduce them to
writing, or get letters from out-of-court witnesses, and then bring those writings to court
to be read as testimony against a defendant without giving that defendant an opportunity
to cross examine. The classic example was during Sir Walter Raleigh's trial wherein a
letter written by his co-conspirator Lord Cobham was read in open court without Cobham
being present. See, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
B.

The overwhelming majority of courts have held calibration certificates
are nontestimonial and thus are admissible at trial regardless whether
the technician is available.

8

The overwhelming majority of courts, if not a unanimous majority, have held
calibration certificates are nontestimonial and thus are admissible ai dial iv^iinih' >
whether the technician is as ailable. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15 (Or. Ct. App.
200S), review denied, State v. Norman, 132 P.3d28 (Or. 2006); Green v. DeMarco. 812
N.Y.S.2d 772 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); People v. So Young Kim, 368 111. App. 3d 717 (Til
App. Ct. 2006); State v. Carter, 125 P.3d 1001 (Monl. 'DOS); Jarrell v. State, N52 N i\2cl
1022 (Ind. Ct App. 2006); Bohsancurt v. Kisenbere, 1 H> !> M * / i (Anz. Ct App. 2006);
Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570 (Ky. 2006); State v. Godshalk. 381 N.J.
Super. 326 (NJ. Sup. Ct 2005); People v. Kanhai, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N Y ( 'rim. i t.
2005); Neal v. State, 635 S.E.2d 864 (t m i t App. ,MM)h>.
The rationale fnrihese holdings was well-explained State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15
(< ii 11 App. 2005), review denied. State v. Norman, 132 P.3d28 (Or. 2006). Defendant
was stopped for a headlight violation, odor of alcohol led to field sobriety tests, which
showed impairment sufficient to arrest after \\hw\\ <iii mloxily/er test showed an illegal
Mood alrnhol level nl'O I s \i inal the technician was unavailable. To lay foundation to
admit defendant's breath test result card, the state offered two foundational
documents/certificates certifying the intoxilyzer had been test.. S :\ r . etiniey IHTI >re and
after defendant's arrest date aitd was working o -..;•!

; ••;•«! dates.

Defendant objected to the certificates' admission on Crawford Sixth Amendment
grounds, was overruled, was eventually convicted, and appealed. On appeal defendant
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argued "that the technicians' statements averring the certification of the intoxilyzer
machine constituted testimonial evidence, and that, because the technicians did not appear
at trial and there was no opportunity to cross-examine them, the documents [were]
inadmissible under Crawford." Norman, 125 P.3d at 17. The court was un-persuaded,
reasoning that there is a qualitative difference between the calibration certificates and
those described in Crawford.
1.

Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are not
accusatory.

Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are not accusatory. The
Oregon court reasoned that calibration certificates "do not resemble the classic
testimonial evidence at which the Confrontation Clause was aimed," meaning out-ofcourt "ex parte examinations of [living] witnesses" whose testimony was "intended to be
used to convict a particular defendant of a crime." Id. at 18; see also, Green v. DeMarco,
812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 783 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) ("neither document in question accuses
anyone of conduct that is criminal. They are neutral in character, relating only to the
operation of the breath test instrument.... The ex parte statement at issue in Crawford
was inculpatory in that it refuted the defendant's claim of self-defense."); People v. So
Young Kim, 368 111. App. 3d 717, 719 (111. App. Ct. 2006) ("a breathalyzer certification is
simply not accusatory: it does not accuse any particular person of any particular crime. ...
[T]he evidence is not "against" any particular defendant. ... The evidence is not compiled
during an investigation of a particular crime, as Crawford contemplates."); State v. Carter,
10

125 P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005) ("certification reports are nontestimonial in nature in
that they are foundational, rather than substantive or accusatory")Thus, since calibration certificates aic not accusatory, .is contrasted witli ex parte
examinations at common law or Sylvia Crawford's statement to the police, they are
nontestimonial, and their preparer - the technician - is constitutionally excused from
appearing at trial. In a DUI the evidence that is accusatory is the actual breath test result
card, because it identifies a particular defendant and is pivpaied against him or her for the
specific pm poM1 nl hnth eriminal prosecution and civil driver license suspension, and that
test result card is introduced at trial through a living witness - the arresting officer - who
is and should be subject to "testing in the crucible of cross examii•:•-

Crawford, 541

U.S. at 61.
2.

• a.

Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are prepared
on an administrative schedule without regard to whether any
particular defendant is arrested for DUL
Calibration certificates5 administrative li sum work.'

The process by which calibration certificates come into being is statutorily
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. 41-6a-515 (2005), former Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3
(2004). That statute reads in part: "The commissioner of the departn. i ^

! . - u .:* sh

standards for the administration and iiuerprelation of ehemieal analysis of a person's
brealli

" 1 'lah ( 'ode Ann, § 41-6a-515(a). Those standards are codified at UTAH

ADMIN. RULE 714-500. Addendum A The certified breath test technician
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("technician") must follow those standards when he or she checks and calibrates the
intoxilyzer, and the information garnered from those actions are reduced to writing in the
form of the calibration certificates. The technician must check and calibrate the
intoxilyzer instrument every forty (40) days and certify it to be working correctly. UTAH
ADMIN. RULE 714-500-5D(3). Should an intoxilyzer be found not working correctly it
would be removed from service for repairs. UTAH ADMIN. RULE 714-500-4D(3). It is the
data observed during calibration and testing procedures that are reduced to
writing/transferred onto the calibration certificates by checking the "yes" or "no55 boxes
on the calibration certificates, making notations thereon, if any, and swearing to the
certificate's accuracy. The calibration certificates contain preprinted standard language,
and within that standard language, the technician checks off boxes and fills in blanks.
This writing or transference is done pursuant to UTAH ADMIN. RULE 714-500-5D(5),
which reads, "Results of tests for certification shall be kept in a permanent record book
retained by the technician. A report of the certification procedure shall be recorded on the
approved form (affidavit) [calibration certificate] and sent to the program supervisor." Id.
The approved form is the calibration certificate. The technician's name is on the
calibration certificate. In this case the technician was Utah Highway Patrol (UHP)
Trooper Byron Camacho and it is he who was unavailable when this case was set for trial.
R. 42. The program supervisor's name is also on the calibration certificates. Calibration
certificates are public records available for inspection by the general public at a published

12

address "during normal business hours ... more specifically the Utah Highway Patrol
Training Section, 5681 S[outh] 320 West, Murray, UT 84107 " UTAH ADMIN. i<u i
500-4D(2). In every DUT case the arresting oifi(( as »• • -: :

•*•

^ n

H-

^-i i; !,^

Utah Cmk Ann $ J M-22 i ( 1005) niusl sriul lo (lie Driver License Division the
following within ten days of a DUI arrest: (a) the arrested person's confiscated driver
license; (b) a copy of the DUI citation; (c) a signed DUI Report Form. These are used at
the civil administrative driver license suspension hcai mj', ( «' i« "I hoannjri vJih h >,•
• separate from flio crimmnl I )l II prosecution arising out of an arrest. The calibration
certificates have a dual purpose. One purpose is for use at the civil hearing where the
hearing officer must have them for foundation to receive the breath test resu

H

ADMIN.RULE708 H-sH), n> H'llio ho.iiiniiolTuvnlni's inn IM\O !lie calibration
ccrtil icates, his or her finding and order is not valid. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). A second purpose is for use by a prosecuting agency in a DT TI
prosecution.
b.

Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are prepared
on an administrative schedule without regard to whether any
particular defendant is arrested for DUI.

Calibration certificate preparation simply is not case-dependent or fact-dependent
because intoxilyzers are maintained and calibrated regardless wlial docs or docs no!
happen on llio \nih\w io;uh\;iv*

1 IK'V -nv prepared before and after an arrestee's arrest

(hie regardless whether he or she is arrested.
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"[Certifications of breath-test machines is removed from the direct investigation
or direct proof of whether any particular defendant has operated while intoxicated...."
Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding calibration
certificates nontestimonial). Further, "the certificates are not prepared in anticipation of
litigation in any particular case or with respect to implicating any specific defendant." Id.
Rather, "[t]he periodic certification of breath test machines ... is mandated by ...
regulations, regardless of whether the machine is ever actually used in an OWI
investigation." Id. (emphasis added).
Since calibration certificates are prepared as part of administrative routine without
a particular defendant in mind, they are distinct from both ex parte common law
examinations and Sylvia Crawford's statement to the police.
3.

Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are directed
toward reporting machine/instrument test results, not toward a
defendant in a specific case.

Calibration certificates nontestimonial because they are directed toward reporting
machine/instrument test results, not toward a defendant in a specific case. The
"Confrontation Clause is directed at the methodology of... prosecutorial examinations of
potential witnesses ... for the purpose of establishing or proving a fact in issue in [a] case
being prosecuted ... [rjather than being directed at evidence about the accuracy of a
machine result." Norman, 125 P.3d at 18; see also, Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d
471, 477 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) ("the type of evidence contained in calibration records
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primarily abstract data output from a machine with no relationship to a particular
defendant - is not the sort of evidence with which the Framer's were concerned")
(emphasis added).
A s writings cr s -,

•* - e . i

: ; u t ii'um an instrument, calibration

certificates are not directed toward a particular defendant in a particular case as distinct
from those in Crawford.
4.

Calibration certificates are nontestimoiiial because c 'hnicians
do not function in an investigative or policing role.

Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because technicians do not function in
an investigative or policing role. Technicians do not act like current-day police officers
patrolling for DI JIs and detectives who investigate spev ifie fuel allegations allcHedh
committed by specific suspects in investigations of specific crimes, let alone like that of
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English justices of the peace. As the Oregon court
stated: "[T]here is no evidence on the record that the technicians were fundi* mmg as the
proxy of the police investigation concerning (lie defendant

" Noniian, 125 P.2d at 19.

In atktii ii HI [ u]nlike police or prosecutorial interrogators, the technicians have no
demonstrable interest in whether the certifications produce evidence that is favorable or
adverse to a particular defendant.../' Id Thus, "the function of the. technicians Millers
significantly from that of the p ublic officers who^e actions or methodology implicated
confrontation issues at common law." IdL
In a DUI the arresting officer who makes the traffic stop, conducts the field
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sobriety tests, arrests and transports the arrestee to the station, and administers the breath
test does function in a role analogous to the police in Crawford. It is his or her actions not the technician's - which are and should be subject to confrontation.
In fact in this case the arresting officers and the technician were employees of
different government agencies, the Salt Lake City Police Department and the Utah State
Highway Patrol, respectively. R. 3, 42.
5.

Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because the technicians
perform routine neutral administrative functions which could just as
well exonerate a DUI defendant as convict him or her.

Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because the technicians perform
mechanical routine administrative functions which could just as well exonerate a DUI
defendant as convict him or her: "A properly operating breathalyzer instrument could just
as well prove innocence as guilt. Thus [the technician] was not bearing testimony against
Respondent." Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006); see also.
People v. So Young Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92, 94 ("it is conceivable a reading below .08 could
... exonerate a suspect/')
6.

Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they contain the
kind of information not likely to be either bolstered or discredited
during cross examination.

Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they contain the kind of
information not likely to be either bolstered or discredited during cross examination.
While the technician is conducting maintenance checks pursuant to the administrative
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rule, his or her actions consist of observing the instrument and recording/transferring
neutral data output on pre-printed forms/calibration certificates. As such, certificates are
"evidence ... as easily and reliably proven by the documents theim o
testimony/'' Green v. DeMarco, 81J N.Y.S.2d 77?, 7 • ' <' '

- ^ .

\ ;;

- ** ^i. lOlo,.

During i loss examination generally "the accused has an opportunity.. .of testing
the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness" so the jury "may look at him
and judge by his demeanor and the manner in which he gives his testimony w hetlici he Is
worthy oft ;,.i, -

iVlurray City v. Hall 6(>3 I> ^f H14, \.\U (Utah 1983). Butwhenone

"consid *» N1 i he nature of [certificate] evidence ... together with the duty of the analyst to
follow carefully delineated guidelines ... and the objective nature of the facts recorded,
both the need for and the utility of confrontafu m a( III.H
State v. Ruiz,

:

x

would ippcai to be tniniiiuh '

V- 1995) (pre-Crawford case upholding

admission of certificates in absence of technician preparer against Confrontation Clause
challenge).
Also, "there is no basis lor coiHvivinjj dial ,i Slair Polii r Inspector would violate
Ins ilutv Jiiil certify thai a breathalyzer was functioning properly when the truth was to the
contrary." Godshalk, 381 N J . Super, at 332-33 (parenthesis omitted) (post-Crawford case
holding calibration certificates nontestimonial). Neither is there e\ en any "moti v e to
misrepresent" on c a - ^ i ,
lindings and a pa- .••'.*

- rrfvahs ~}\u\iu$c the ^ ^ ii- l^rw\ ;; [thetechnician's]
mi un a particular prosecution is too attenuated." State v.
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Huggins, 659 P.2d 613, 616 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) fore-Crawford case upholding
certificate admission against Sixth Amendment attack). Thus, "[t]o interrupt the public
business by requiring" the technician to testify "would appear to serve no useful
purpose..." because cross examination is not likely to show a change in recollection, a
faulty conscience or motivation of interest in the outcome a particular case. Id.
Thus there can be no utility to cross examining the technician when the certificates
suffice. The policy interest in streamlining DUI trials is discussed infra.
7.

Calibration certificates do not meet Davis v. Washington's "primary
purpose" test and therefore they cannot be characterized as
testimonial.

Davis v. Washington adopted a "primary purpose" test, holding that statements
"are testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ... ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution." Id., 126 S.Ct. at 2274.
Appellant argues Davis's primary-purpose test requires this Court to hold calibration
certificates are testimonial. Considered one at a time, however, the Davis factors show
calibration certificates cannot be characterized as testimonial.
a.

Ongoing emergency: the city agrees when the technician calibrated the
intoxilyzer there was no ongoing emergency.

Appellant argues there was no ongoing emergency when the technician calibrated
the intoxilyzer. In Davis the out-of-court statements defendant sought to exclude were
made by his victim to a 911 dispatcher "as they were actually happening," and thus were
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not excluded on confrontation grounds. Id. at 2276.

The city agrees it cannot assert

that when the technician checks the intoxilyzer there is an ongoing emergency.
b.

Primary purpose: calibration certificates do not have a "primary
purpose,5' they have a "dual purpose."

The primary purpose of the procedures leading to calibration certificates is to insure
the integrity of the intoxilyzer. The certificates themselves do not have a primary
purpose, they have a dual purpose. One purpose is at civil administrative driver license
suspension hearings required as a matter of law. UTAH ADMIN. RULE 708-14-9(4), (5)
(2005). If the hearing officer does not have them he or she cannot make a valid order
regarding driver license suspension or revocation. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). A second purpose is use as foundational documents for
introducing the actual breath test result in criminal prosecutions for DUI. As a matter of
logic, a thing cannot have a primary purpose and a dual purpose. It may have a primary
purpose and secondary purpose, or it may have a dual purpose.
The certificates do not name a victim, a perpetrator, or an offense of any kind
whereas a victim's frantic 911 call may include all three. The Davis 911 caller told the
dispatcher the suspect's name and, in colloquial terms, the crime (assault): "He's here
jumpin' on me again. ... He's usin' his fists. ... It's Davis." Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2271.
Thus, the calibration certificates do not meet the primary purpose test.
c.

Interrogation: the technician does not "interrogate" the intoxilizer prior
to producing calibration certificates.
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The technician does not "interrogate" the intoxilyzer prior to producing calibration
certificates containing the out-of-court statement; he or she observes its neutral data
output during maintenance checks and eventually reduces those observations to writing.
At the time of the first maintenance check, which precedes an arrestee's arrest date there
is no defendant to interrogate and no allegation of an offense to investigate.
One form of "interrogation" in the DUI sense would be if the prosecution
attempted to use incriminating statements or observations made by third parties, for
example those made by other drivers, without having those third parties present to testify.
Those third parties' statements would be inadmissible hearsay unless they were present at
trial to be cross examined.
Another is the arresting officer's observations of an arrestee's performance on
field sobriety tests, blowing into the intoxilyzer and recordation of any statements the
arrestee makes (e.g., "I was at the bar since noon.") which the prosecution may later seek
to use. The arresting officer's presence at trial is required to introduce the evidence he or
she gathers and he or she is thus subject to cross examination.
d.

Past events: the "past events" the technician observes do not relate to a
"past crime" under Davis,

The "past events" the technician observes do not relate to a "past crime" under
Davis: "When we said in Crawford that interrogations by law enforcement officers fall
squarely within the class of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately in mind (for that was
the case before us) interrogations solely directed at establishing facts of a past crime, in
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order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator." Davis, 126 S.Ct. at
2276 (emphasis added; brackets, citations, quotations omitted).
The "past events" the technician observes are not events of a past crime, and the
information he or she supplies in the certificate cannot establish any element of a DUI.
Nor do the technician's observations occur on the DUI offense date. In a DUI it is the
arresting officer's observations (including the actual test result card), not the technician's,
which relate to establishing the facts or elements of a past crime. The calibration
certificates are prepared routinely in a 40-day administrative maintenance cycle
"regardless of whether the machine [was] ever actually used in an OWI investigation."
Jarrell 852 N.E.2d at 1026.
e.

The calibration certificates are not "potentially relevant to a later
criminal prosecution" as Davis contemplates.

The calibration certificates are not "potentially relevant to a later criminal
prosecution" as Davis contemplates: "We do acknowledge ... certificates might be said to
have been prepared in anticipation of litigation in one sense, in that... they may be used
in future drunk driving prosecutions .... However, certification ... is removed from the
direct investigation or direct proof of whether any particular defendant has operated a
vehicle while intoxicated; the certificates are not prepared in anticipation of litigation in
any particular case or with respect to any particular defendant." Jarrell 852 N.E.2d at
1026; see also, Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006) ("[The
technician] probably knows when he prepares his maintenance and test records that the
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information contained therein might be used at a trial though probably not which trials.55)
(parenthesis omitted).
Davis contemplates the hearsay statements have an intended use against a
particular defendant for a criminal charge arising out of the facts about which the
statements are made, whereas as the calibration certificates do not.
8.

The cases on which appellant relies are both factually and legally
distinct from this appeal.

Appellant relies on Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2005), which
is factually distinct from this appeal. In Florida the "breath test affidavit" serving as
"presumptive proof of an arrestee's breath test and what Florida terms the "affidavit"
(calibration certificate in Utah) apparently are combined in one card/document: "Critical
here, the affidavit was also relied upon by the State ... to establish the date of
performance of the most recent required maintenance." Id. at617. 1
In Shiver, the trooper, in addition to making the arrest, also signed a "breath test
affidavit" in which he certified that another person - i.e., the breath testing technician in
charge of testing the instrument - had certified the instrument to be working correctly. In
other words the arresting trooper attested to certification of an instrument performed by
another person. In the instant appeal the certificates were signed by the technician who
himself inspected the intoxilyzer eventually used to test appellant's breath. Thus Shiver

In Florida apparently usual practice is for arresting officers transport arrestees to a
location where a separate breath testing technician administers the breath test. See, Belvin
v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006), discussed infra.
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is not better reasoned, it is factually and legally distinct from this appeal.
Appellant relies on Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006), which
specifically states it does not address the issue in this appeal: "petitioner has not raised the
issue of whether those portions of the breath test affidavit pertaining to the maintenance
and inspection of the breath test instrument violate the Confrontation Clause under
Crawford." Id
In Belvin the arresting officer transported the arrested driver to a breath-testing
facility, after which a separate officer, the breath test technician herself, operated the
instrument to get a breath test, and she also contemporaneously prepared the breath test
affidavit - which in Florida apparently is a component part of the same card/document
which gives the arrestee's BAC. But she did not testify at trial. The court overturned the
conviction because the technician who elicited the incriminating evidence from the
defendant (his breath result) was not at trial, not because calibration certificates (called
affidavits in Florida) are inadmissible. They are admissible: "These statutory provisions
[analogous to § 41-6a-515] permit the breath test affidavits to be admitted as a public
records exception to the hearsay rule." IdL at 1048-49. Thus Belvin is not better
reasoned, it is factually and legally distinct.
Appellant relies on Martin v. State, 936 So. 2d 1190 (Ct. App. Fl. 2006). There a
lab report showing test results of substances (cocaine and cannabis) seized directly from a
specific defendant was prepared to prosecute a specific case was introduced without the
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lab technician's presence at trial. Martin does not involve breath testing calibration
certificates. The court held the report was testimonial and its introduction without the lab
technician's presence at trial was a confrontation rights violation but that holding has no
persuasive force here because that case is factually distinct. Id. at 1193.
State v. Campbell 719 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 2006), on which appellant relies, also
did not involve breath testing certificates, but rather a lab report similar to that in Martin,
and that report was introduced to convict two co-defendants of marijuana possession. In
Campbell there was a DUI charge but that does not appear to have been appealed, nor
does the case report discuss breath testing calibration certificates.
The question in State v. Bertui 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983), on which appellant
relies, was whether "police reports of crimes" are admissible where defendant sought to
admit his jail booking sheet showing the box for "intoxicated" checked off to prove his
intoxication defense. The Utah Supreme Court held a defendant should be permitted to
admit the police report of his arrest in his defense, but "[w]hen offered by the prosecution
... they should ordinarily be excluded, except when offered to prove simple routine
matters which Eire based on first-hand knowledge of the maker of the report and do not
involve conclusions, and when the circumstances of their preparation indicate their
trustworthiness." Id. at 1185.
Appellant seeks to apply BertuTs language excluding police reports by arguing
calibration certificates are analogous to police reports. Such a claim was made and

24

rejected in State v. Ward, 474 N.E.2d 300 (Ohio 1984). Defendant there sought to
exclude "certified copies of police logs showing calibration of intoxilyzer equipment"
under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. Ohio's public records exception,
like Utah's, allows admission of public records without foundation regardless of witness
availability, excluding "in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other
law enforcement personnel." Id at 302.
The Ohio court held the hearsay rule's exclusion language, "prohibits the
introduction of reports which recite an officer's observations of criminal activities or
observations made as part of an investigation of criminal activities." IcL However, "this
phrase does not prohibit introduction of records of a routine, intra-police, or machine
maintenance nature, such as intoxilyzer calibration logs" because "[s]uch routine records
are highly likely to be reliable, and precisely the type contemplated as admissible by the
public records exception to the rule against hearsay." Id. at 302. See also, Huggins, 659
P.2d at 616 ("[a]n ordinary police accident report is often colored by the officer's
judgment and frequently incorporates opinions gathered from second-hand sources who
have a stake in pending litigation," whereas "the [certification] packet itself is merely a
record of factual findings recorded in the regular course of business.. .made
independently and well in advance of any particular prosecution.")
The reasoning underlying Ward is consistent with that underlying Bertul in that
calibration certificates are not subject to "perception, recall, the manner of language used,
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or the soundness of conclusions by the author of the report," Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185, in
the same way police reports are, because an intoxilyzer technician almost robotically or
mechanically records raw data output and checks off boxes on pre-printed
forms/calibration certificates after he or she has set up the testing equipment. The same
analysis distinguishes this appeal from Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294 (Utah App.
1990), cited b)f defendant, wherein the jailer prepared an incident report to violate a
specific defendant's probation.
Appellant relies on State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 122 P.3d 639. In Workman a
lab technician personally took samples from a home where officers had served a search
warrant and then analyzed them and determined they were contraband. Since the lab
technician was unavailable for trial the State sought to have the lab technician's
supervisor testify as a substitute witness. The Utah Supreme Court held it was error to
have the supervisor testify for three reasons. First, the nature of the testing was subjective
(the tests depended "upon subjective inferences by the testing party, based ... on their
training and experience)." Id. at ^ 15. Second, given the nature of the tests, it would have
been very difficult for the defendants to challenge the evidence without cross-examining
those personally involved in the testing. Id. at Tf 17. Third, the testing involved was
materially different from testing in other cases where the court allowed substitute
witnesses in that the testing was not based on "promulgated, rigid guidelines and
standards." I d at H 19-20.
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Workman therefore is distinct for the following reasons. First, unlike the lab
technician who collected evidence and tested it for a specific case, Trooper Camacho did
not perform the calibration inspection to test a specific defendant or to aid in a specific
prosecution. Second, there is no evidence that the testing done by Trooper Camacho
involved any subjective elements. Instead, it appears that the testing is based on
"promulgated, rigid guidelines and standards," making it more like cases where expert
witnesses are allowed to substitute for one another. Id. Third, because there was no
subjective element to Trooper Camacho's testing, this is not the type of evidence that
appellant needs to be allowed to cross examine upon. Finally, the city does not seek to
substitute one expert for another, as in Workman; if the city made that argument below it
has abandoned it on appeal. Instead, Camacho will still be "testifying," he will simply be
testifying via the calibration certificate, which is contemplated by § 41-6a-515.
Therefore, under the analysis thus far, the clear weight of authority favors this
Court ruling that calibration certificates are nontestimonial hearsay admissible regardless
whether the technician is unavailable.
C.

Though calibration certificates are nontestimonial hearsay they are still
hearsay evidence - that has survived Crawford's reach.

Though calibration certificates are nontestimonial, they are still classic hearsay
because they are out-of-court statements by an absent witness being offered for the truth
asserted in them.
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1.

The trial court's ruling.

The trial court ruled Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 (former Utah Code Ann. 41-644.3) is constitutional and that calibration certificates are admissible under it. Thus it did
not need to reach traditional hearsay exceptions to make its ruling. R. 87, footnote 3.
Addendum C.
But clarification is needed as to what kind of hearsay calibration certificates are.
And, importantly, under what exception are they admitted? Appellant's challenge to § 416a-515's constitutionality affords this Court the opportunity to specifically hold that
calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents under a statutorily-created
hearsay exception whose foundational threshold for admissibility is equivalent to that of
public records and are thus admissible without the technician's presence at trial.
2.

Calibration certificates are admissible under traditional hearsay
exceptions.

Post-Crawford decisions holding calibration certificates or their equivalent are
nontestimonial characterize them variously as public records, business records, both
public records and business records, and statutorily self-authenticating. See, e.g.,
Norman, 125 P.3d at 18 (public records); People v. Kanhai 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 2005) (business records); Godshalk, 885 A.2d at 973 (business records and
official records); Walther, 189 S.W.2d 570, 573 (statutorily self-authenticating); Neal v.
State, 635 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (statutorily self-authenticating).
3.

The public records exception has survived Crawford's reach because
public records are by their nature nontestimonial.
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Public records are an exception to the hearsay rule which has survived Crawford's
reach because public records are by their nature nontestimonial: "there were always
exceptions to the general rules of exclusion of hearsay evidence." Crawford, 541 U.S. at
56. (brackets and quotation marks omitted). "Most of the hearsay exceptions [at common
law] covered statements that by their nature were nontestimonial - for example, business
records....' 5 Id, "To its credit, the Court's analysis of "testimony" excludes at least some
hearsay exceptions, such as business records and official records." Id. at 76 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring).
"Because the Sixth Amendment is implicitly deemed to incorporate the hearsay
exceptions [already long] established at the time of the founding, it follows that modernday hearsay exceptions enacted by statute will not be deemed testimonial in nature if they
parallel the hearsay exceptions that were not by their nature testimonial at common
law...." Norman, 125 P.3d at 12. "[TJhere is no other [hearsay] exception at common law
that has a more firm basis than the public records exception." Id. It follows that
calibration certificates parallel a common law exception and their status as admissible
without foundation testimony is undisturbed by Crawford, as this Court has recognized
post-Crawford: "In contrast nontestimonial hearsay can be admitted under generally
accepted exceptions to the hearsay rule without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment."
Williams, 2005 UT App 493 111.
The requested holding will "secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in
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administration, and the elimination of unnecessary expense and delay." Utah R. Crim. P.
1; see also, Utah R. Evid. 102. The trial court found the calibration certificates in this
case were prepared consistent with § 41-6a-515 and this point is not in dispute. R. 85,
footnote 2. Addendum C.
4.

Calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents under
Utah § 41-6a-515, which is a statutory exception to the hearsay rule.

This Court has ruled "Utah Rule Evid. 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible
except as provided by law or by these rules. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 [now § 41-6a515] was enacted as a statutory exception the hearsay rule and its validity [has been]
affirmed.... Rule 802 clearly contemplates that other statutory provisions may similarly
apply as valid exceptions to otherwise inadmissible hearsay." Layton City v. Bennett. 741
P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis in original; citation and quotation marks
omitted).
5.

Calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents which do not
require the presence of a foundational witness prior to admission into
evidence.

Calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents which do not require the
presence of a foundational witness prior to admission into evidence: "[A] certificate of
inspection is self authenticating when it is prepared and executed, as prescribed in
[Georgia's statute analogous to § 41-6-44.3]." Neal v. State, 635 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2006) (post-Crawford case holding calibration certificates are admissible nontestimonial hearsay); see also, Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 572-73 (Ky.
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2006) ("[maintenance and test records] were otherwise admissible without extrinsic
evidence of authenticity, i.e., additional testimony of [the technician]") (post-Crawford
case holding calibration certificates nontestimonial hearsay); United States v. Wilkinson,
804 F.Supp. 263 (D. Utah 1992) ("the affidavits [calibration certificates] ... are selfauthenticating documents under Fed. R. Evid. 902(4). ... [t]he court finds that no
additional testimonial foundation is required for their admission into evidence") (preCrawford case challenging admission of certificates on "confusing terms"). In addition,
calibration certificates are open for public inspection during regular business hours. UTAH
ADMIN. RULE 714-500-4D(2). Thus, they are self-authenticating documents admissible
without foundational testimony from the technician/preparer or from any other person.
While these points may seem evident, the city has found no Utah state case
specifically so holding, and Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), discussed
infra, has led to unnecessary confusion, delay and expense in Utah DUI prosecutions, as
demonstrated by appellant's argument on this point discussed infra.
6.

Sound judicial policy supports holding calibration certificates
are self-authenticating documents requiring no foundational testimony
in this case or in any case.

Sound judicial policy supports holding calibration certificates are selfauthenticating documents requiring no foundational testimony in this case or in any case.
The reasons are evident from this appeal and from United States v. Wilkinson, 804
F.Supp. 263 (D. Utah 1992). At trial the Wilkinson court ruled the calibration certificates
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were admissible under § 41-6-44.3 (now § 41-6a-515) but on rehearing opined that it
might have erred in so doing, and then ruled calibration certificates were admissible on
alternate grounds under the public records exception to the hearsay rule, codified at Fed.
R. Evid. 803(8).
Nevertheless, defense counsel in Wilkinson, notwithstanding the court's ruling that
calibration certificates were admissible under § 41-6-44.3 or the public records exception,
still argued for the presence of some person in some capacity to attend trial to verify the
public record's authenticity.
When defendant "assert[ed] that "based upon [rule] 803 it is assumed that there
will at least be an individual there to testify to the accuracy and correctness of the
documents,"" the court noted defendant "fail[ed] to cite any authority to support his
position" or "offer further insight into how he would prefer to see foundation
...established," finally "find[ing] that the affidavits [certificates] are ... selfauthenticating documents under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(4)." Id. at 268.
A public record does not require a custodian of records to lay foundation whereas a
business record does. Utah R. Evid. 803(6), (8). Thus, if this Court clarifies that
calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents whose foundational threshold
for admissibility is equivalent to that of public records, it can halt practices such as was
attempted in Wilkinson - and in this appeal - and thus help "secure simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unnecessary expense and
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delay." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 1. Since Wilkinson is not binding on Utah courts, were this
Court to not clarify this issue, the current efforts to subpoena technicians for repetitive
testimony on foundational issues would be replaced with efforts to subpoena some person
in the capacity of a business record custodian from the UHP to lay needless foundation, as
defense counsel's efforts in Wilkinson demonstrate.
A second reason sound judicial policy supports holding calibration certificates are
self-authenticating documents is the proliferation of justice courts. DUIs are prosecuted
primarily as class B misdemeanors, unless there is an enhancing factor like "child
present" in the instant appeal. Jurisdiction for class B misdemeanors is injustice court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104 (1997). Justice courts are courts not of record. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-5-101 (1999). While de novo appeal from justice court to district court is a
simple matter, appeal from district court is limited to where "the district court rules on the
constitutionality of a statute of a statute or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (7)
(2001). This has resulted in a paucity of case law relating to DUIs in Utah and thus
clarifying law is needed for practitioners.
Under the analysis thus far, in addition to holding calibration certificates are
nontestimonial and thus admissible regardless whether the technician is available, this
Court should hold calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents whose
foundational threshold for admissibility is equivalent to that of public records, i.e.,
without foundational testimony.
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D,

Even under Murray City v. Hall calibration certificates are selfauthenticating documents which do not require the presence of a
foundational witness prior to admission.

Appellant argues "that the state [city] cannot use a substitute witness" in place of
the missing technician. Br. of App. p. 22. That assumes the city is required to produce a
technician at trial for admission of the certificates, or at least that one be available. In the
same vein, appellant argues that under Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1319-21
(Utah 1983), he is entitled to subpoena the technician but since the technician was
unavailable out of the country when this case was set for trial, the city may not use the
calibration certificates in his absence. Br. of App. pp. 8-9. If the city made an argument
for a substitute technician/witness in the trial court, and that is unclear, the city hereby
abandons that point on appeal. Even under Hall the city may introduce the foundational
calibration certificates without the technician.
1.

The holding in Hall.

In Hall, decided prior to Crawford, the Utah Supreme Court upheld § 41-6-44.3
(now § 41-6a-515) when it was challenged on confrontation clause grounds, holding "so
long as there is .. .contemporaneous preparation [of the certificates] in accordance with
established standards, in the regular course of the officer's duties, and indications of
trustworthiness" the calibration certificates are "admissible under § 41-6-44.3 [now § 416a-515] as a valid statutory exception to the hearsay rule." Id. at 1321. The "right of
confrontation is not absolute. In certain instances it must yield to legitimate government
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interests." IdL "The enactment of § 41-6-44.3 manifests an intent by the Legislature to
relieve the State of Utah and other governmental entities of the financial burden and
inconvenience of calling as a witness in every DUI case the public officer responsible for
testing...." Id at 1322.
To that point in its holding and policy reasoning, Hall is consistent with both preCrawford and post-Crawford cases. See e.g., State v. Huggins, 659 P.2d 613, 616
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (pre-Crawford: "To interrupt public business by requiring the
personal testimony of each officer involved in compiling a particular breathalyzer packet
would appear to serve no useful purpose5'); Jarrell, 852 N.E. 2d 1022, 1028 (postCrawford: "our supreme court has concluded that our legislature properly fashioned an
inspection and certification scheme to insure the reliability of test results, thereby
protecting the rights of the accused, while at the same time streamlining the trial
process/5)
The universal acceptance and reliability of modem breath testing technology is
implicit in state statutory schemes nation-wide allowing admission of calibration
certificates as self-authenticating documents without foundational testimony from their
preparer. Indeed, thirty years ago one court suggested the universal acceptance and
reliability of breath testing instruments had risen nearly to the level of blood pressure
readings and electrocardiograms. People v. Gower, 42 N.Y.2d 117 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977);
see also, Roosevelt City Corp. v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
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("[Section 41-6-443 now § 41-6a-515] is a legislative recognition of the universal
acceptance of the reliability of such evidence."); citing HalL 663 P.2d at 1320
2.

Hall's dicta

Appellant argues Hall's holding is conditioned on the technician's availability: "In
fact, if an accused feels that the machine was not functioning properly or wants to prove
non-compliance with the [calibration] standards established ... he/she can subpoena the
public safety officer for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer .... The appellant
apparently chose not to do so." HalL 663 P.2d at 1322 (emphasis added). Appellant
notes that in the instant case the technician was not just "unavailable" in that he was not
subpoenaed, but "unavailable" in that he was out of the country and could not be
subpoenaed even if appellant attempted to. Br. of App. p. 4; R. 42.
Appellant argues that language conditions Hall's holding on factual availability
that was not taken advantage of, and therefore Hall is inapplicable here. Br. of App. p. 8.
To read Hall in that manner is to say Hall stands for the proposition that § 41-6-44.3
(now § 41-6a-515) does not violate confrontation rights because it allows a defendant to
exercise confrontation rights - if they want to by simply issuing a subpoena.

That

argument is unpersuasive on its own logic and for the following reasons.
3.

Hall's dicta is inconsistent with the legislative intent of § 41-6-44.3
which was to relieve technicians from needlessly appearing in court,
not to leave them open to subpoena by the defense in every DUI case.

Hall's dicta is inconsistent with the legislative intent of § 41-6-44.3 (now § 41-6a-
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515) which was to relieve technicians from needlessly appearing in court not to leave
them open to subpoena by the defense in every DUI case. The legislative history states
the purpose of that section was to avoid requiring technicians to appear in court to give
foundation testimony:
The Utah Highway Patrol provides a technician to appear in court and to certify
the breath test instrument used. In some instances these officers may explain the
tests they perform on the instruments several times to the same judge on the same
day. This bill requires the Commissioner of Public Safety to establish standards
for administration and interpretation of the breath test results. This bill quotes,
almost verbatim, the exception to the hearsay rule and also creates a presumption
that the test result is valid without further foundation when done in a specified
manner.
1979 UTAH S. J. 43RD LEGIS. GEN. SESS. N O . 1, at 713-14.
Thus, § 41-6-44.3 was not enacted to merely shift whose office - the prosecutor's
or defense counsel's - issues the subpoena. The intent was systemic relief by simplifying
procedure, eliminating unnecessary expense and avoiding delay. Section 41-6-44.3 (now
41-6a-515) simplifies trials by not having foundational testimony about what went into
producing the calibration certificates elicited in every DUI; it eliminates the expense of
subpoenaing technicians and the expense of having personnel cover their duties while at
trial; and it avoids delay by use of tactics like 'show up drills' - which the court avoided
in Wilkinson - wherein valueless foundation witnesses are subpoenaed, which only has
the effect of necessitating witness coordination with the prospect of little or no utility
resulting from the sought for cross examination. Also, under appellant's reasoning, in
circumstances where two separate technicians perform calibration maintenance checks 37

one technician before a defendant's arrest date and a second technician after the arrest
date - appellant would be arguing to cross examine both technicians, thus further
consuming time and resources and extending the length of trials. Norman itself spoke of
technicians in the plural. Norman, 125 P.2d at 19. In the section immediately below the
city attempts to demonstrate appellant's questions have little prospect of being useful
cross examination.
The legislative intent in Utah and other states with statutes similar to § 41-6a-515
was to streamline trial process where universally accepted breath testing technology is
used and its accuracy can be assured with certificates and specifically contemplates that a
DUI in which there is breath test evidence shall be prosecuted without the technician,
period "[S]o long as there is...contemporaneous preparation [of the certificates] in
accordance with established standards, in the regular course of the officer's duties, and
indications of trustworthiness...." Hall, 663 P.2d at 1321. That finding is for the trial
court to make, not the jury. This appeal and Wilkinson demonstrate how far afield from
the legislative intent DUI practice may deviate.
Under the foregoing discussion this Court should not be persuaded that Hall's
holding is conditioned on a technician's factual availability.
4.

Appellant's proposed questions for the technician demonstrate the
utility of cross examination would be minimal or remote.

Appellant's proposed questions for the technician demonstrate the utility of cross
examination would be minimal or remote. The questions about the simulator solution
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and other matters are not only so remote from the accusatory actual evidence - meaning
the test result card itself as opposed to the foundational calibration certificates - they are
already answered in the certificate.
Appellant's brief, at p. 19, reads: ".. .the trooper must make sure the air pump
works and also run the air pump for twelve to fifteen seconds, [and then asks] How long
the trooper waited." Id, He already answered that when he checked "yes" to box number
three (3). Appellant also asks about the simulator solution used during calibration
procedures. That was answered when the technician checked "yes" to box numbers seven
(7) and nine (9).
Since there is no suggestion the technician would testify he or she really did not do
what the certificate indicates there is no reason for his or her appearance. See, State v.
Godshalk, 381 N J . Super. 326, 332-33 ("there is no basis for conceiving that a State
Police Inspector would violate his duty and certify that a breathalyzer was functioning
properly when the truth was to the contrary"). Similarly there is no reason to believe the
technician was distracted by errant officers moving about in the room where the
intoxilyzer is kept during calibration procedures. Br. of App. p. 19.
Thus, there is no utility at law to subpoena the technician to a DUI trial or even an
evidentiary hearing. "To the extent [appellant's] complaint really is that he [will not be]
able to cross-examine the preparer of the [intoxilyzer] certificate regarding the
maintenance and certification process, he simply is restating his Crawford objection under
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a slightly different guise." Jarrell 852 N.E.2d. 1022, 1027. The only possible utility
would be to go beyond the certificate's contents and into questions about the intoxilyzer's
underlying technology, as Jarrell recognized.
Such efforts run counter to the legislative intent to avoid forcing "officers [to]
explain the tests they perform on the instruments...." and to the universal acceptance of
breath testing technology and systematized calibration procedures. 1979 UTAH S. J. 43RD
LEGIS. GEN. SESS. NO. 1, at 713-14; Roosevelt City Corp. v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738, 740
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[Section 41-6-44.3] is a legislative recognition of the universal
acceptance of the reliability of such evidence.")
5.

The city is not arguing for an absolute bar to cross examining the
technician - it is appropriate in limited circumstances.

The city is not arguing for an absolute bar to cross examining the technician - it is
appropriate in limited circumstances. But Hall's language could give the impression the
defense is permitted to subpoena the technician when he or she "feels" the machine was
not functioning properly or "wants" to prove the technician did not comply with the
applicable administrative standards. Hall, 663 P.2d at 1322. That is not what Hall meant.
At law, motions and actions like subpoenaing a person or requesting a hearing
must be founded upon some basis in law or fact: "A motion shall state succinctly and with
particularity the grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought." Utah R. Crim. P.
12(a).
One post-Crawford calibration certificate case addressing whether there must be
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merit to subpoenaing the technician is State v. Carter, 114 P.3d 1001 (Mont. 2005), which
found no trial court error in admitting "certification reports, despite that fact that the
authors of the report were not present to testify and be confronted." Id at 1007.
Importantly, the court then stated that if defendant's pretrial investigation reveals some
error in the certificates or that they are otherwise subject to attack, it is then and only then
that defendant may subpoena the technician:
That is not to say, however, that the authors of these certification reports may
never be called to testify in person. If, in a given case, the defendant's pretrial
investigation reveals that the reports are in error or are otherwise subject to attacks
the defendant is always free to subpoena the authors for purposes of testifying at a
hearing on a timely filed motion to suppress evidence or at trial for impeachment
purposes.
Id. at 1007 (emphasis added); see also, State v. Huggins, 659 P.2d 613 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982) (pre-Crawford: "in the absence of some specific evidence in a specific case that a
specific record fisl inaccurate" it "would serve no useful purpose" ... "to interrupt public
business by requiring the personal testimony of each officer involved in compiling a
particular breathalyzer packet") (emphasis added).
In light of the above logical argument, clear legislative intent, and Carter and
Huggins, this Court should hold that calibration certificates are self-authenticating
documents and that in the absence of some specific defect within its four corners that a
calibration certificate is inaccurate, a DUI defendant is not permitted to subpoena the
technician. This court should further hold that where the defense can point to some
specific evidence in a specific case that a certificate is inaccurate, the hearing held is one
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to determine the admissibility of the calibration certificates, which is a question for the
court not the jury. Utah R. Evid. 104(a) ("the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court"); see Carter, 114 P.3d at 1007.
Such a hearing may be warranted in circumstances where the calibration certificate
is illegible, the serial numbers did not match, the notation lines contain an illegible entry
(rather than a clear statement "no repairs" in the instant case), or where a box was not
checked or it was checked "no" then erased and checked "yes," or some other possible
aspect that could raise the possibility of inaccuracy. But here, where the calibration
certificates are filled out perfectly, there is no basis at law to subpoena the technician to
an evidentiary hearing, let alone have them cross examined before a jury on a
foundational question of admissibility.
6.

Even assuming appellant's reading of Hall is correct, that case has been
overruled by Crawford,

Even assuming appellant's reading of Hall is correct, to the extent Hall is
inconsistent with Crawford, it is no longer valid law. The city has supplied
overwhelming post-Crawford case law holding that calibration certificates showing
compliance with applicable administrative rules are admissible without violating a DUI
arrestee's confrontation rights, regardless of technician availability. The only conceivable
post-Crawford circumstance under which subpoenaing the technician would be warranted
is that suggested by Carter and Huggins above. But in this appeal, where the calibration
certificates are filled out properly and appellant's proposed questions are answered in the
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certificate, there can be no valid reason at law reason to require the technician's presence.
Hall was decided on federal constitutional grounds as was Crawford, and
appellant's arguments regarding Hall raise no separate state constitutional analysis. Br. of
App. pp. 8-10. Appellant may not therefore assert a separate state constitutional analysis
in a reply brief when he did not do so in his merits brief. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851,
854 n. 1 (Utah 1992) (rejecting state constitutional argument raised for first time in reply
brief).
CONCLUSION
While the authorities above are not binding on this Court, based on the points and
authorities discussed above this Court should hold calibration certificates are
nontestimonial hearsay and thus their introduction into evidence without the technician's
presence at trial, and the statute enabling their introduction into evidence, does not violate
appellant's confrontation rights. As part of its holding this Court should hold calibration
certificates are self-authenticating documents and that in the absence of some specific
defect within their four corners indicating inaccuracy, a DUI defendant is not permitted to
subpoena the technician. This court should further hold that where the defense can point
to some specific defect in a certificate is inaccurate, the hearing held is one to determine
the admissibility of the calibration certificates, which is a question for the court and not
the jury.

43

rd

Respectfully submitted this 23r day of April 2007.
SALT LAKE CITY CORP.

Edward A. Berkovich
Attorney for Appellee

44

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Edward A. Berkovich, certify that I have caused to be delivered
eight copies of the foregoing brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South
State Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, Attorney for the Appellant,
at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on this day of
AprhV^ , 2007.

Edward A. Berkovich
Attorney for Plaintiff Appellee

(This page is intentionally left blank.)

Tab A

ADDENDUM A
(STATUTES AND PROVISIONS)

(This page is intentionally left blank.)

41-6a-515. Standards for chemical breath or oral fluids analysis evidence
(1) The commissioner of the department shall establish standards for the
administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath or oral
fluids, including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts,
conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument
used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsection (1), are
admissible
if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and
circumstances
of
their
preparation
indicate
their
trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) and
the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that the
test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is
unnecessary.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 2, 2005 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3
Standards for chemical breath analysis - Evidence.
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a
person's breath, including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was
operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions, or
events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument used was
accurate, according to standards established in Subsection (1), are admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the investigation
at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) and the
conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that the test
results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is
unnecessary.
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UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
PUBLIC SAFETY
R714. HIGHWAY PATROL.
Current through December 1,2005
R714-500. Chemical Analysis Standards and Training.
R714-500-1. Purpose.
A. It is the purpose of this rule to set forth:
(1) Procedures whereby the department may certify:
(a) Breath alcohol testing instruments;
(b) Breath alcohol testing programs;
(c) Breath alcohol testing operators;
(d) Breath alcohol testing technicians; and
(e) Breath alcohol testing program supervisors.
(2) Adjudicative procedure concerning:
(a) Application for and denial, suspension or revocation of the aforementioned certifications; and
(b) Appeal of initial department action concerning the aforementioned certifications.
R714-500-2. Authority.
A. This rule is authorized by Subsection 41-6-44.3(1) which requires the commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety, hereinafter departments to establish standards for the administration and inteipretation of chemical analysis
of a person's breath, including standards of training.
R714-500-3. Application for Certification.
A. Application for any certification herein shall be made on forms provided by the department in accordance with
Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(c).
R714-500-4. Instrument Certification.
A. Acceptance: All breath alcohol testing instruments employed by Utah law enforcement officers, to be used for
evidentiary purposes, shall be approved by the department.
(1) The department shall maintain an approved list of accepted instruments for use in the state. Law enforcement entities shall select breath alcohol instruments from this accepted list, which list shall be available for public inspection
at the department during normal working hours
(2) A manufacturer may make application for approval uf an instrument by brand and/or model not on the list The
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department shall subsequently examine and evaluate each instrument to determine if it meets criteria specified, by
this rule and applicable purchase requisitions.
B. Criteria: In order to be approved, each manufacturer's brand and/or model of breath testing instrument shall meet
the following criteria.
(1) Breath alcohol analysis of an instrument shall be based on the principle of infra-red energy absorption, or any
other similarly effective procedure specified by the department
(2) Breath specimen collected for analysis shall be essentially alveolar and/or end expiratory in composition according to the analysis method utilized.
(3) The instrument shall analyze a reference sample, such as headspace gas from a mixture of water and a known
weight or volume of ethanol, held at a constant temperature, or a compressed inert gas and alcohol mixture in a pressurized cylinder. The result of the analysis must agree with the reference sample's predicted value, within plus or
minus 5%, or .005, whichever is greater, or such limits as set by the department For example, if a known reference
sample is .10, a plus or minus range of 5%=.005 (.10x5 %= .005). The test result, using a known .10 solution or
compressed inert gas and alcohol solution, could range from .095-. 105.
(4) The instrument shall provide an accurate and consistent analysis of breath specimen for the determination of alcohol concentration for law enforcement purposes. The instrument shall function within the manufacturer's specifications of:
(a) electrical power,
(b) operating temperature,
(c) internal purge,
(d) internal calibration,
(e) diagnostic measurements,
(f) invalid test procedures,
(g) known reference sample testing,
(h) measurements of breath alcohol, as displayed in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(5) Any other tests, deemed necessary by the department, may be required in order to correctly and adequately evaluate the instrument, to give the most accurate and correct results in routine breath alcohol testing and be practical
and reliable for law enforcement purposes.
C. List: Upon proof of compliance with this rule, an instrument may be approved by brand and/or model and placed
on the list of accepted instruments. By inclusion on the department's list of accepted instruments, it will be deemed
to have met the criteria listed above.
D. Certification: All breath alcohol instruments purchased for law enforcement evidentiary purposes, shall be certified before being placed into service.
(1) The breath alcohol testing program supervisor, hereinafter, "program supervisor", shall determine if each indi-
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vidual instrument, by serial number, conforms to the brand and/or model that appears on the commissioner's accepted list.
(2) Once an individual instrument has been purchased* found to be operating correctly and placed into service the
affidavit with the serial number of that instrument, shall be placed in a file for certified instruments. Affidavits verifying the certification of any breath testing instrument shall be available during normal business hours through the
Department of Public Safety, more specifically the Utah Highway Patrol Training Section, 5681 S. 320 West, Murray, UT 84107.
(3) The department may, at any time, determine if a specific instrument is unreliable and/or unserviceable. Pending
such a finding, an instrument may be removed from service and certification may be withdrawn.
(4) Only certified breath alcohol testing technicians, hereinafter "technicians*, as defined by Section 7 of this rule
when required, shall be authorized to provide expert testimony concerning the certification and all other aspects o f
the breath testing instrument under his/her supervision.
R714-500-5. Program Certification.
A. All breath alcohol testing techniques, methods, and programs, hereinafter "program", must be certified by the department.
B. Prior to initiating a program, an agency or laboratory shall submit an application to the department for certification. The application shall show the brand and/or model of the instrument to be used and contain a resume of the
program to be followed. An on-site inspection shall be made by the department to determine compliance with all applicable provisions in this rule.
C. Certification of a program may be denied, suspended, or revoked by the department if, based on information obtained by the department, program supervisor, or technician, the agency or laboratory fails to meet the criteria as
outlined by the department.
D. All programs, in order to be certified, shall meet the following criteria:
(1) The results of tests to determine the concentration of alcohol on a person's breath shall be expressed as equivalent grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The results of such tests shall be entered in a permanent record book
for department use.
(2) Printed checklists, outlining the method of properly performing breath tests shall be available at each location
where tests are given. Test record cards used in conjunction with breath testing shall be available at each location
where tests are given. Both the checklist and test record card, after completion of a test should be retained by the operator.
(3) The instruments shall be certified on a routine basis, not to exceed 40 days between calibration tests, by a technician, depending on location of instruments and area of responsibility.
(4) Certification procedures to certify the breath testing instrument shall be performed by a technician as required in
this rule, or by using such procedures as recommended by the manufacturer of the instrument to meet its performance specifications, as derived from:
(a) electrical power tests,
(b) operating temperature tests,
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(c) internal purge tests,
(d) internal calibration tests,
(e) diagnostic tests,
(f) invalid function tests,
(g) known reference samples testing, and
(h) measurements displayed in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(5) Results of tests for certification shall be kept in a permanent record book retained by the technician. A report o f
the certification procedure shall be recorded on the approved form (affidavit) and sent to the program supervisor.
(6) Except as set forth in paragraph 7 in this section, all analytical results on a subject test shall be recorded, using
terminology established by state statute and reported to three decimal places. For example, a result of 0.237g/210L
shall be reported as 0.237.
(7) Internal standards on a subject test do not have to be recorded numerically.
(8) The instrument must be operated by either a certified operator or technician.
R714-500-6. Operator Certification.
A. All breath alcohol testing operators, hereinafter "operators*, must be certified by the department
B. All training for initial and renewal certification will be conducted by a program supervisor and/or technician.
C. Initial Certification
(1) In order to apply for certification as an operator of a breath testing instrument, an applicant must successfully
complete a course of instruction approved by the department, which must include as a minimum the following:
a. One hour of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body.
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing.
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citation/D.U.I. Report Form.
d. One and one half hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing, driving under the influence case
law and other alcohol related laws.
e. One and one half hours of laboratory participation performing simulated tests on the instruments, including
demonstrations under the supervision of a class instructor.
f. One hour for examination and critique of course.
(2) After successful completion of the initial certification course a certificate will be issued that will be valid for two
years.
D. Renewal Certification
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(1) The operator is required to renew certification prior to its expiration date. The minimum requirement for renewal
of operator certification will be:
a. Two hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body.
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing.
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citation/D.U.L Report Form and testimony of arresting officer.
d. Two hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing and detecting the drinking driver.
e. One hour for examination and critique of course.
f. Or the operator must successfully complete the Compact Disc Computer program including successful completion
of exam. Results of exams must be forwarded to program supervisor and a certification certificate will be issued.
(2) Any operator who allows his/her certification to expire one year or longer must retake and successfully complete
the initial certification course as outlined in paragraph C of this section.
R714-500-7. Technician Certification.
A. All technicians, must be certified by the department.
B. The minimum qualifications for certification as a technician are:
(1) Satisfactory completion of the operator's initial certification course and/or renewal certification course.
(2) Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's course offered by Indiana University, or an
equivalent course of instruction, as approved by the program supervisor.
(3) Satisfactory completion of the manufacturer's maintenance/repair technician course.
(4) Maintain technician's status through a minimum of eight hours training each calendar year. This training must be
directly related to the breath alcohol testing program, and must be approved by the program supervisor.
C. Any technician who fails to meet the requirements of paragraph B, sub-paragraph (4) of this section and allows
his/her certification to expire for more than one year, must renew his/her certification by meeting the minimum requirements as outlined in paragraph B, sub-paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this section.
R714-500-8. Program Supervisor Certification.
A. The program supervisor will be required to meet the minimum certification standards set forth in section 7 of this
rule. Certification should be within one year after initial appointment or other time as stated by the department.
R714-500-9. Previously Certified Personnel.
A. This rule shall not be construed as invalidating the certification of personnel previously certified as operators under programs existing prior to the promulgation of this rule. Such personnel shall be deemed certified, provided they
meet the training requirements as outlined in section 6, paragraph D of this rule.
B. This rule shall not be construed as invalidating the certification of personnel previously certified as a technician
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under programs existing prior to the promulgation of this rule. Such personnel shall be deemed certified, provided
they meet the training requirements in section 77 paragraph B, sub-paragraph (4) of this rule.
R714-5G0-10. Revocation or Suspension of Certification,
A. The department may, on the recommendation of the program supervisor, revoke or suspend the certification o f
any operator or technician:
(1) Who fails to comply with or meet any of the criteria required in this rule.
(2) Who falsely or deceitfully obtained certification.
(3) Who fails to show proficiency in proper operation of the breath testing instrument
(4) For other good cause.
R714-500-11. Adjudicative Proceedings.
A. Purpose of section. It is the purpose of this section to set forth adjudicative proceedings in compliance with Title
63 Chapter 46b.
B. Designation. All adjudicative proceedings performed by the department shall proceed informally as set forth
herein and as authorized by Sections 63- 46b-4 and 63-46b-5.
C. Denial, suspension or revocation. A party who is denied certification or whose certification is suspended or revoked, will be informed within a period of 30 days by the department the reasons for denial, suspension, or revocation.
D. Appeal of denial, suspension, or revocation. A party who is denied certification or whose certification is suspended or revoked may appeal to the commissioner or designee on a form provided by the department in accordance
with Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(c). The appeal must be filed within ten days after receiving notice of the department
action.
E. No hearing will be granted to the party. The commissioner or designee will merely review the appeal and issue a
written decision to the party within ten days after receiving the appeal.
KEY: alcohol, intoxilyzer, breath testing, operator certification
October 3, 2002

Notice of Continuation May 12, 2005
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U.S. Constitution: Sixth Amendment
Sixth Amendment - Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 102. Purpose and construction.
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 104. Preliminary questions.
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges.
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (2005)
(5) As a matter of procedure, a peace officer shall send to the division
within ten calendar days after the day on which notice is provided:
(a)
the
person's
license
certificate;
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense;
(c) a signed report in a manner specified by the division indicating
the
chemical
test
results,
if
any;
and
(d) any other basis for the peace officer's determination that the
person has violated Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517.

Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these
rules.

Rule 803.
immaterial.

Hearsay

exceptions;

availability

of

declarant

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that
complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting
certification, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The
term "business"^ as used in this paragraph includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth
(A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty
to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by
police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil
actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant
to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

Rule 902. Self-authentication
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to
admissibility is not required with respect to the following:
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document
purporting to bear the signature in the official capacity of an officer or
employee of any entity included in Paragraph (1) hereof, having no
seal, if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the
district or political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies
under seal that the signer has the official capacity and that the
signature is genuine.
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or
report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be
recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office,
including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the
custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by
certificate complying with Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or
complying with any law of the United States or of this state.
(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a
certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by
law by a notary public or other officer authorized by law to take
acknowledgments.
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of
authentication or identification provided by court rule, statute, or as
provided in the constitution of this state.
(11) Certified domestic records of regularly conducted activity - The
original or a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted
activity that would be admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied
by an affidavit or a written declaration of its custodian or other
qualified person, certifying that:
(A) the record was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the
matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge of those matters;

(B) the record was kept in the course of the regularly conducted
activity;
(C) the record was made by the regularly conducted activity as a
regular practice; and
(D) the person certifying the records does so under penalty of making
a false statement in an official proceeding.
The affidavit or declaration must be signed in a manner that, if falsely
made, would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the laws
where the declaration is signed. A party intending to offer a record
into evidence under this paragraph must provide written notice of that
intention to all adverse parties, and must make the record and
certification available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their
offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity
to challenge them.
Advisory Committee Note B The amendment to Rule 803(6) and the
addition of Rules 902(11) and 902(12) were made to track the
changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) and the adoption
of Federal Rules 902(11) and 902(12), effective December 1, 2000.
The changes to the federal rules benefit from a federal statute
allowing the use of declarations without notarization. Utah has no
comparable statute, so the requirements for declarations used under
the rule are included within the rule itself.

R708-14-8- Hearing Procedures.
(1) Time and place. Alcohol/drug adjudicative pro! ceedings will be held in the county of arrest, at a time
and place designated by the division, or agreed upon
by the parties.
£2) ffotice. Notice shall be given as provided i n
by the parties. Notice shall be given on a form approved by the division and is deemed to be signed by
the presiding officer. The notice need only inform the
parties as to the date, time, place, and basic purpose of
ifae proceeding. The parties are deemed to have
knowledge of the law.
(3) Default. If the driver fails to respond timely to a
division request or notice, a default may be entered in
accordance with Section 63-46b-ll.
(4) Evidence. Hie parties and witnesses may testify
under oath, present evidence, and comment on pertinent issues, The presiding officer may exclude irrelevant, repetitious, immaterial, or privileged information or evidence. The presiding officer may consider
hearsay evidence and receive documentary evidence,
including copies or excerpts.
(5) Information. The driver shall have access to
information in the division file to the extent permitted
by law.
(6) Subpoenas. Discovery is prohibited, but the
division may issue subpoenas or other orders to compel production of necessary evidence. Subpoenas may
be issued by the division at the request of the driver if
the costs of the subpoenas are paid by the driver and
will not delay the proceeding.
(7) Administrative notice. The presiding officer has
discretion to take administrative notice of records,
procedures, rules, policies, technical scientific facts
within the presiding officer's specialized knowledge or
experience, or of any other facts that could be judicially noticed.
(8) Presiding officer. The presiding officer may:
(a) administer oaths;
(b) issue subpoenas;
(c) conduct prehearing conferences by telephone or
in person to clarify issues, dispose of procedural
questions, and expedite the hearing;

78-5-101.

C r e a t i o n of justice c o u r t — Not of
record.
Under Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution,
there is created a court not of record known as the
justice court. The judges of this court are justice court
judges.
m 9

78-5-104. Jurisdiction.
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and
C misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction,
except those offenses over which the juvenile court
has exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims
cases under Title 78, Chapter 6, Small Claims Courts,
if the defendant resides in or the debt arose within the
territorial jurisdiction of the justice court.
1997

78-5-120. A p p e a l s from justice court — Trial or
hearing' d e novo in district court.
(1) In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a
trial de novo in the district court only if the defendant
files a notice of appeal within 30 days of:
(a) sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a
plea of guilty in the justice court resulting in a
finding or verdict of guilt; or
(b) a plea of guilty in the justice court that is
held in abeyance.
(2) If an appeal under Subsection (1) is of a plea
entered pursuant to negotiation with the prosecutor,
and the defendant did not reserve the right to appeal
as part of the plea negotiation, the negotiation is
voided by the appeal.
(3) A defendant convicted and sentenced in justice
court is entitled to a hearing de novo in the district
court on the following matters, if he files a notice of
appeal within 30 days of:
(a) an order rfevoking probation;
(b) an order entering a judgment of guilt pursuant to the person's failure to fulfil the terms of
a plea in abeyance agreement;
(c) a sentence entered pursuant to Subsection
(3)(b); or
(d) an order denying a motion to withdraw a
plea.
(4) The prosecutor is entitled to a hearing de novo
in the district court on:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of a
speedy trial;
(d) a judgment holding invalid any part of a
statute or ordinance;
(e) a pretrial order excluding evidence, when
the prosecutor certifies that exclusion of that
evidence prevents continued prosecution; or
(f) an order granting a motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty or no contest.
(5) Upon entering a decision in a hearing de novo,
the district court shall remand the case to the justice
court unless:
(a) the decision results in immediate dismissal
of the case;
(b) with agreement of the parties, the district
court consents to retain jurisdiction; or
(c) the defendant enters a plea of guilty in the
district court.
(6) The district court shall retain jurisdiction over
the case on trial de novo.
(7) The decision of the district court is final and
may not be appealed unless the district court rules on
the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.
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Department of Public Safety
ROBERT L FLOWERS
Commissioner

State of Utah
ON M HUNTSMAN JR
Governor

CUSTODIAN CERTIFICATE

GARY R HERBERT
Lieutenant Governor

I, the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that:
1

I am the Breathtesting Supervisor of the Utah Highway Patrol and the official keeper of and
responsible for the maintenance check records of the breathtesting instruments maintained in
State of Utah.

2.

Attached are true and correct copies of the records of maintenance and certification for the
Intoxilyzer serial numberffi~~£&235(p
located at ^ S L d P D V'lcs^OiAsof which are kept on file by me, in the course of official business, for the State of Utah,
Department of Public Safety and in accordance with the current regulations of the Commissio
of Public Safety.

3.

The attached tests were done BEFORE and AFTER the date of

Mavdk 51
4.

5

,2W? -

The breathtest technicians) whose signature(s) appear on the attached affidavit(s) are certified
the State of Utah and has/have met all of the following requirements as required by the
Department of Public Safety:
a.
Satisfactory completion of operator's initial certification course and/or renewal course;
b.
Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's course offered by tl
Indiana University, or an equivalent course of instruction, as approved by the Breath
Alcohol Testing Program;
c.
Satisfactory completion of a Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument Manufacturer's
Maintenance/Repair Technician course for the instruments in use in the State of Utah or
is qualified by nature of his/her employment or training to maintain/repair those
instruments;
d.
Maintain Technician's status through a minimum of eight (8) hours related training each
calendar year.
I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matter alleged in this affidavit
NOTARY Hl'iLIC

PAUL KOTTER
5681 South 320 West
Murray. Utah 84107
My Commission Expires
April 21, 2007

STATE OF UTAH

/4-J^<y\

l/^MsHjTtk-AAL

Sergeant Steven Winward
Breathtesting Supervisor
Utah Highway Patrol

iTATE OF UTAH
*OUNTY OFL
^SU
N THE
LV*~ DAY OF
ay.
) 5 , PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME, STEVEN
WWARD WHO BEING DULY SWQ BEFORE
TECUTED THE ABOVE REFERENCED CERTIFICATE AND I
\RTIFY~THAT SAID PERSON IS AN OFFICER AND~EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT 67PUBLfc*SAFETT O T T H E
kTE OF UTAH AND IS THE LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS OF SAID DEPARTMENT ANC
\ l HIS SIGNATURE AFFIXED HERETO IS GENUINE
NOTARY PUBLIC
~
m Development and Technology Center, 5681 South 120 West Salt Lake Qtv UT 84107

i

i PLA!NTIF£SS
' :i!SJEXH!BI] "*"

Utnhl
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Utah Department of Public Safsty
Ceirincate of Calibration;
Intoxilyzer 5000 / 8000
We the undersigne4 being first duly sworn, state than
1.
Breath testing insmmenr l O T O m x Z E R , serial number C^J^O
W d

2.
•>.
4.

Yes/'No-

S<L

&&J3

A

C

,
*
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ _
waspTop^chc-ei
mrme/us m ihe course of official dunes, on., '"?7osrA q/.2£*:>r~a
/O&i^
Last prior check of this instrument was done on / ^ /
^
;?<.->^rThis tvas done by a currently certified technician and according ro the standards
•established by the Commissioner ofihe Utah Department of Public Safctv
This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were made a the time * f ™
tests were done.
^ ^ ^5w
I am/We are competent to testify and h a w personal knowledge of the matters d W . * ^
this certificate.
O-IC^WM. i s
THE F O L L O W I N G TESTS WS3SK MAINE:
Electrical Power Check?
(Red power switch OIL Displays "Not Ready")
Temperature Check:
(Displays cePusb button to start test", etc)
3.
Internal P u r e e Check:
(Air pump works, runs for approximately 12 to 15 seconds.)
Internal CaKbration Check:
(Internal standards within factory specifications)
Invalid Test:
(Push the green start test button while the iuslm merit is in test mode.)
Diagnostic Check:
(Prom check, Ram check, Temperature check, Processor check; Printer check)
7.
Checked with Known Sample:
(Simulator, 3 tests within + or - .005 or 5% whichever is greatest)
8.
Gives Headings in:
(Grams'ofAlcohol /210 Liters ofBreath)
The Simulator Solution:
(Was of the correct kind and properiy compounded)
10.
The Results of This Test Show:
(Thai the instrument is weeiting properiy)
REPAIRS REQUIRED: (Explain) M
tfffrt^c

NOTARY PUBLIC
STEVEN WINWARD

CEjpiTEZ) 3SEATH TEST TECHNICIANS

5881 South 320 West
Murray, Utah B4107
My Commission Expires

!

I/We op. oath, statethe foregoing is true.

May 5. 2007

STATE OF UTAH
(NOTARY SEAL)

Subscribed and sworn before me this

,

,

^ ^ l a y of
(Day)

//

~

//\**JU^

i ^ ^ ^ , ^ ^

(EILAINTIFFS^

(Year)

~7
BiACrcant sw IQrtM
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Utah Department of Public Safety
Certificate of Calibration
Lnioxilyzer 5000 / 8000
I, We the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that
TQXILYZS3L serial number.
Breath testing mstrumenc T^TTi
1.
i
c
was
iocsrecL 9x
*-s^
' * *r ~"/, ?c>/7t
^ r . '_—
^
^*wj^«**j checked
wuuuawu
r£'s^>
rTh.wproperly
byme/us m die course of official dudes, QnJ^S///(J7
Zt&^tr
a
s&s^
Last prior check of this instrument was done vn.i&c^^
2/
SJ>^>j^
This was done by a currently certified technician 2nd according ro the standards
cstabhsfied by the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety.
This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were made ar the time these
tests were done.
I am/We are competent to testify and have personal kmrwledge of the matters alleged in
this ceroncaie,

&&0-23ZA

T S E FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MABE:
Yss/No22,
D

3.

a/a

X2TU
8

rr [•
10.

•

Electrical Power Check:
(Red power switch OIL Displays "Not Ready")
Temperature Check:
(Displays Tush button to start testf\ etc)
Internal Purge Check:
{Air pump "woncs, runs for approximately 12 to 15 seconds.)
Internal Calibration Check:
(Internal standards within factory specifications)
Invalid Tesii
(Push the green start test button while the instrument is in test mode.)
Diagnostic Check:
(Prom check, Ram check, Temperature check, Processor check. Printer check;
Checked with Known Sample:
(Simulator, 3 tests within + or - 005 or 5% whichever is greatest)
Gives Readings in:
(Grams of Alcohol / 210 Liters of Breath)
The Simulator Solution:
(Was of the correct kind and properiy compounded)
The ResnJts of This Test Show:
(That the instrument is working properiy)

KEPABKS REQUIRED: (Explain) ZlA &*fi6//1NOTARY PUBLIC
PAUL KOTTER
5681 South 320 Wect
Murrev, Utah 84107
My Commission Expires
April 21 2007

C I T I F I E D SHEATH TEST TECHNICIANS
/

STATE OF UTAH

I/We,.on oaih. state,the foregoing is true.

(NOTARY SEAL)

Subscribed and sworn before me this

-fayof

(Day)
V

/$s?f/'/

<' rMnnrtT

'&*£
aiACTaim TB* in/rii
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(TRIAL COURT ORDER)

(This page is intentionally left blank.)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 055900090
Judge Robin W. Reese

FREDERICK GEORGE,

Date: June 7, 2 006

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion in Limine.
Having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties,1 the Court
enters the following decision and finds that Defendant's Motion should
be DENIED.
At issue here are two Certificates of Calibration of Intoxilyzer
5000/8000 prepared by Trooper Byron Camacho.
It is undisputed that
Trooper Camacho is currently out of the country and is unavailable to
testify that he performed the checks on the breath testing instrument at
issue
here.
Therefore, the State would
like to admit
the
Certificates/Affidavits completed by Trooper Camacho in lieu of his
testimony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515. Section 41-6a-515
provides:
(1) The commissioner of the department shall establish
standards for the administration and interpretation of
chemical analysis of a person's breath or oral fluids,
including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or
records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the
analysis was made and the instrument used was accurate,
according to standards established in Subsection (1) , are
admissible if:

1

The Court would like to note that counsel for both the defense and for the City provided
well-written and well-researched memoranda, significantly easing the Court's burden in reaching
this decision.
f \
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(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course
of the investigation at or about the time of the act,
condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and the-method
and circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid
and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.
Defendant does not argue that the Certificates/Affidavits Trooper
Camacho prepared do not comport with the requirements of § 41~6a-515. 2
Rather, Defendant asserts that Section 41-6a-515 and the admission of
the Certifications violates the Confrontation Clause because Defendant
will not be allowed to examine Trooper Camacho.
At the outset, the Court notes that Murray
1314 (Utah 1983) appears to resolve this issue.
that :

City
v.
In Hall,

Hall,
663 P. 2d
the court held

given the (1) legitimate governmental interest in not having
to produce in every DUI case the public officer responsible
for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules,
and (2) the alternative means available to an accused to
cross-examine and confront such a witness, we hold that § 416-44.3 [the previous version of Section 41-6a-515] does not
violate the appellant's constitutional right of confrontation
when all of its requirements are met.
Id. at 1322. However, Hall raises two problems which limit this Court's
ability to rely on the decision. First, Hall
specifically stated that
if an accused wants to question the public officer responsible for
testing the breathalyzer, the accused has the right to subpoena the
officer.
In the present case, Trooper Camacho"s unavailability means
that Defendant cannot subpoena him. Second, Hall
was decided prior to
the seminal case of Crawford
v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354,
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) . Therefore, the Court must determine whether the
affidavits can be admitted even though Defendant cannot call Camacho to

* 2 Although no argument was raised on this point, the Court finds that the
Certificates/Affidavits are in compliance with Section 41 -6a-515.

^
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Hall.

In Crawford,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[testimonial
statements of witnesses absent from trial [are admissible] only where
the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine-. "--541-U. S . at 59.- This—overruled
the previous test from Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980) which held
that hearsay statements were admissible if they bore "adequate indicia
of reliability." The court in Crawford
found that "unpardonable vice"
of the "reliability" test was that it admitted "core testimonial
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude." 541
U.S. at 63 (emphasis in original).
Crawford
said that the Sixth
Amendment intended to only admit those exceptions that existed at the
time of its founding. Id. at 54. At that time " [m] ost of the hearsay
exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial
- for
example, business records or statements in furtherance of a
conspiracy." Id. at 56.
It is undisputed in the present case that, while the declarant
(Trooper Camacho) is unavailable, Defendant did not have the opportunity
to cross examine him.
Therefore, according to Crawford,
Camacho's
affidavits violate the Confrontation Clause if they are "testimonial."
The Court is persuaded that Camacho's affidavits are nontestimonial. Crawford
specifically leaves "for another day any effort
to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.'" Id. at 68.
However, a number of jurisdictions have recently addressed this same
issue and it appears that the majority of have found that Intoxilyzer
certifications are not testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause.
See, e.g.,
Bohsancurt
v. Honorable
Eisenberg,
129 P.3d 471
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Rackoff
v. State, 621 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. Ct. App.
2005); Napier
v. State,
827 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); State v.
Norman,
125 P. 3d 15 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); Luginbyhl
v. Commonwealth,
618
S.E.2d 347 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
In particular, Oregon held in Norman
that Crawford
and State
v.
Mack,
101 P. 3d 349 (Ore. 2004) set the "parameters for determining
whether evidence is 'testimonial in nature' under the Sixth Amendment"
and those parameters are not satisfied by Intoxilyzer certifications.
125 P.3d at 18. First, the certifications are not intended to be used
to convict a particular defendant of a crime but are evidence of the
accuracy of a test result arrived at by a machine. Evidence of the
accuracy of a test result does not implicate the methodology of police
or prosecutorial
examinations
of
potential
witnesses,
as
the
Confrontation Clause is concerned about Id.
Second, the technicians
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were not acting as proxy for the police in their investigative
functions, they were merely ensuring that the machines operated properly
and provided accurate results.
"Unlike police or prosecutorial
interrogators, the technicians have not demonstrable interest in whether
the certifications produce evidence that is favorable or adverse to a
particular defendant." Td. at 18-19. Finally, exceptions for admission
of Intoxilyzer certifications parallel the historical hearsay exceptions
that were deemed non-testimonial, particularly the business records
exception. Id. at 19.
The Court is persuaded by Norman, et. al. that Crawford
would not
change
the
result
in Hall
because
§ 41-6a-515
only
admits
Certifications which are non-testimonial because they were not prepared
to be used against a particular defendant, they are not based on
subjective factors such as police interrogation methods, and Section 416a-515 is derived from the historical business records hearsay
exception.3 Additionally, the Court finds that this holding resolves the
other problem with Hall,
that it indicated that the State had not
violated the Confrontation Clause because the defendant could call the
technician to testify. Because the Certifications are non-testimonial,
Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not violated even though he
cannot call Trooper Camacho to testify.
Defendant relies on a number a number of cases from other
jurisdictions which found "breath test affidavits" inadmissible.
However, Defendant's reliance is misplaced.
Specifically, Defendant
relies on People
v. Rogers,
780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 8 A.D.3d 888 (2004) and
Shiver
v. State,
900 So.2d 615 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005).
The Court is
persuaded by
Bohsancurt's
specific distinction of those cases.
Bohsancurt
held that Rogers was distinguishable because "it held that .
laboratory reports are testimonial, [but such] reports [are]
inculpatory in a way that calibration and maintenance records are not.
. . . In contrast to the types of reports involved in [Rogers] , the
recorded results of calibration testing in the abstract do not relate to
any specific defendant or particular case."
129 P. 3d at 478.
Bohsancurt
also distinguished Shiver
by saying,
[a]Ithough at first blush it appears Shiver
dealt with records
similar to Arizona's QARs. The Florida records actually
included breath-test results of the individual defendant in

3

The City argues that, if Section 41-6a-515 is invalidated, the Certifications/Affidavits
are also admissible under the business records exception. The Court does not reach this issue
because it finds that Section 41-6a-515 is constitutional
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addition to a section in which the officer who conducted the
breath-test had certified that another
officer had calibrated
and
checked
the machine.
Those
facts
are
clearly
distinguishable from those presented here.
Id. at 478 n.6. The Court finds that the other cases cited by Defendant
are clearly distinguishable for the same reasons offered to distinguish

Rogers.
Defendant also relies heavily on State
v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 122
P. 3d 63 9.
In Workman,
Christine Wright of the Utah State Crime
Laboratory personally took samples of substances, etc. from a home where
officers had served a search warrant. Wright then analyzed the samples
and positively identified meth and meth precursors. Id. at H 2. On the
day of trial, Wright was unavailable and the State sought to have
Wright's supervisor, Jennifer McNair, testify as a substitute witness.
Id. at f 5. The Utah Supreme Court found it was error to allow McNair
to testify in place of Wright for three reasons. First, the nature of
the testing was subjective (the tests depended "upon subjective
inferences by the testing party, based, as McNair testified, on their
'training and experience.7 id.
at 1f 15). Id. at ff 13-15.
Second,
given the nature of the tests, it would have been every difficult for
the defendants to challenge the evidence without cross-examining those
personally involved in the testing. Id. at ^| 17. Specifically, because
of the subjective element of the testing, the defendants should have
been allowed to ask questions about whether the testing was conducted
properly.
Id. at |U 17-18. Additionally, Defendant was not able to
prepare for Wright's absence because it was only announced on the day of
the trial. Id. at f 18. Finally, the testing involved in this case was
materially different from testing in other cases where the court allowed
substitute witnesses in that the testing was not based on "promulgated,
rigid guidelines and standards." Id. at ^ 19-20.
It is clear to the Court that Workman is distinct from this case
for a number of reasons. First, unlike Wright who collected evidence
and tested it with regard to a specific case, Trooper Camacho did not
perform the inspection in order to test a specific defendant or to aid
in a specific prosecution.
Second, there is no evidence that the
testing done by Trooper Camacho involved any subjective elements.
Instead, it appears that the testing is based on "promulgated, rigid
guidelines and standards," making it more like cases where expert
witnesses were allowed to substitute for one another. Third, because
there was no subjective element to Trooper Camacho7s testing, this is
not the type of evidence that Defendant needs to be allowed to cross
examine upon.
Fourth, there is no special prejudice to Defendant
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because Trooper Camacho's absence was announced well in advance of
trial. Finally, the City does not seek to "substitute" one expert for
another, as in Workman (and Shiver) . Instead, Camacho will still be
"testifying," he will simply be testifying via affidavit.
Por the foregoing reasons-, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion
in Limine should be DENIED and the City should be allowed to present
Trooper Camacho's Certifications/Affidavits.

<LLP\

